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APPORTIONING CONTRIBUTION SHARES
UNDER THE FEDERAL SECURITIES ACTS:
A SUGGESTED APPROACH FOR
AN UNSETTLED AREA
INTRODUCTION
The federal securities acts1 were designed to produce and enforce a
market system in which there is adequate disclosure of all factual
information that is material to a securities transaction. 2 An issuer
that desires to raise money through a sale of securities must file a
registration statement with the Securities Exchange Commission
(SEC), disclosing all pertinent information. 3 To ensure the accuracy
1. Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-77bbbb (1976); Securities Exchange
Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-78kk (1976).
2. Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 195 (1976); Touche Ross & Co. v.
SEC, 609 F.2d 570, 580 (2d Cir. 1979); Wasson v. SEC, 558 F.2d 879, 886 (8th Cir.
1977); Felts v. National Account Sys. Ass'n, 469 F. Supp. 54, 63 (N.D. Miss. 1978);
Feit v. Leasco Data Processing Equip. Corp., 332 F. Supp. 544, 563 (E.D.N.Y.
1971); Globus v. Law Research Serv., 287 F. Supp. 188, 199 (S.D.N.Y. 1968), aff d
in part, rev'd in part on other grounds, 418 F.2d 1276 (2d Cir. 1969), cert. denied,
397 U.S. 913 (1970); S. Rep. No. 47, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1933); Folk, Civil
Liabilities Under the Federal Securities Acts: The BarChris Case, 55 Va. L. Rev. 1,
17 (1969); Knauss, A Reappraisal of the Role of Disclosure, 62 Mich. L. Rev. 607,
607 (1964).
3. A registration statement is a disclosure document which the issuer must
prepare and submit to the SEC as a prerequisite to a public offering of securities. The
registration statement contains financial and other information about the issuer and
is intended to provide investors with a factual background for making informed
investment decisions. The information which the issuer must disclose in a registration
statement is set forth in the Securities Act of 1933, Schedule A, 15 U.S.C. § 77aa
(1976). The 1933 Act makes it illegal to perform certain acts in connection with a
public sale of securities without a registration statement. Id. § 5(c), 15 U.S.C. §
77e(c) (1976). Section 5(c) provides that "[i]t shall be unlawful for any person,
directly or indirectly, to make use of any means or instruments of transportation or
communication in interstate commerce or of the mails to offer to sell or offer to buy
through the use or medium of any prospectus or otherwise any security, unless a
registration statement has been filed as to such security, or while the registration
statement is the subject of a refusal order or stop order or (prior to the effective date
of the registration statement) any public proceeding or examination under section
77h of this title." Id. The registration statement filed pursuant to § 5(c) must become
effective before the securities may be sold in interstate commerce. Id. § 5(a), 15
U.S.C. § 77e(a) (1976). "Unless a registration statement is in effect as to a security, it
shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly- (1) to make use of any
means or instruments of transportation or communication in interstate commerce or
of the mails to sell such security through the use or medium of any prospectus or
otherwise; or (2) to carry or cause to be carried through the mails or in interstate
commerce, by any means or instruments of transportation, any such security for the
purpose of sale or for delivery after sale." Id. Ordinarily, a registration statement
automatically becomes effective twenty days after filing unless the SEC finds it to be
inadequate. Id. § 8(a), 15 U.S.C. § 77h(a) (1976). The SEC, however, has the power
to accelerate the effective date of the registration statement if, in its discretion, it
determines that an adequate disclosure has been made. Id.
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of such information and to deter fraud, civil liability is imposed for
material misrepresentations or omissions of material facts.4  Section
11(a) of the Securities Act of 1933 (1933 Act)5 expressly creates a
private cause of action specifically for misrepresentations in registra-
tion statements.6 The purchaser may also have an overlapping cause
of action 7 under the general anti-fraud provision of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934 (1934 Act),8 section 10(b), 9 if he can prove that
4. Securities Act of 1933, § 11(a), 15 U.S.C. § 77k(a) (1976). If the misrepresen-
tation appears in the prospectus, the plaintiff will have an action under § 12 of the
1933 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 771 (1976), as well. Section 12 imposes civil liability upon the
purchaser's immediate seller for material misrepresentations or omissions in prospec-
tuses and oral communications transmitted in interstate commerce for the purpose of
offering or selling securities. Collins v. Signetics Corp., 605 F.2d 110, 113 (3d Cir.
1979); Turner v. First Wis. Mtge. Trust, 454 F. Supp. 899, 912 (E.D. Wis. 1978);
Unicorn Field, Inc. v. Cannon Group, 60 F.R.D. 217, 222-23 (S.D.N.Y. 1973).
Under the scheme of liability imposed by § 12, there is no right to contribution;
instead, liability is apportioned "by allowing each purchaser in the chain of distribu-
tion to pursue an action against his seller." Lawler v. Gilliam, 569 F.2d 1283, 1294
(4th Cir. 1978).
5. 15 U.S.C. § 77k(a) (1976).
6. Id. Section 11(a) of the 1933 Act provides that "[i]n case any part of the
registration statement, when such part became effective, contained an untrue state-
ment of a material fact or omitted to state a material fact required to be stated
therein or necessary to make the statements therein not misleading, any person
acquiring such security (unless it is proved that at the time of such acquisition he
knew of such untruth or omission) may, either at law or in equity, in any court of
competent jurisdiction, sue- (1) every person who signed the registration statement;
(2) every person who was a director of (or person performing similar functions) or
partner in the issuer at the time of the filing of the part of the registration statement
with respect to which his liability is asserted; (3) every person who, with his consent,
is named in the registration statement as being or about to become a director, person
performing similar functions, or partner; (4) every accountant, engineer, or ap-
praiser, or any person whose profession gives authority to a statement made by him,
who has with his consent been named as having prepared or certified any part of the
registration statement, or as having prepared or certified any report or valuation
which is used in connection with the registration statement, with respect to the
statement in such registration statement, report, or valuation, which purports to
have been prepared or certified by him; (5) every underwriter with respect to such
security." Id.
7. See Huddleston v. Herman & MacLean, [1981 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L.
Rep. (CCH) 97,919, at 90,661 (5th Cir. Mar. 9, 1981).
8. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-78kk (1976).
9. Id. § 78j(b). Section 10(b) makes it unlawful to employ any manipulative or
deceptive device in connection with the purchase or sale of securities in contravention
of the rules prescribed by the SEC as necessary for the protection of investors. Id.
Rule 10b-5, 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1981), promulgated pursuant to the rulemaking
authority granted to the SEC under § 10(b), provides that "[it shall be unlawful for
any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any means or instrumentality of
interstate commerce, or of the mails or of any facility of any national securities
exchange, (a) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud, (b) To make any
untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a material fact necessary in
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the defendants acted with scienter.10
In the typical corporate offering of securities, the broad net of
liability fashioned by these two sections falls upon two categories of
defendants: (1) insiders-the issuer and those persons who direct the
issuer's operations; 1 and (2) outsiders-the underwriters and experts,
such as accountants, retained by the issuer to facilitate the sale of the
securities to the investing public.' 2  In the ordinary course of an
offering, these two groups work together closely and have a common
interest in the offering's success.' 3  Liability under sections 11 and
order to make the statements made, in the light of the circumstances under which
they were made, not misleading, or (c) To engage in any act, practice, or course of
business which operates or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person, In
connection with the purchase or sale of any security." Id. Although § 10(b) and rule
lOb-5 do not expressly create a private cause of action, the federal courts have
consistently implied such a cause of action since the decision in Kardon v. National
Gypsum Co., 69 F. Supp. 512, 514 (E.D. Pa. 1946). The Supreme Court expressly
recognized the private right of action. Superintendent of Ins. v. Banker's Life & Cas.
Co., 404 U.S. 6, 13 n.9 (1971).
10. See infra note 105.
11. Section 11 of the 1933 Act expressly provides for liability on the part of every
person who was, or was about to become, a director or partner or person performing
similar functions in the issuer. Securities Act of 1933, § 11(a)(2), (3), 15 U.S.C. §
77k(a)(2), (3) (1976). In addition, specific sections in both the 1933 Act and the 1934
Act make persons who directly or indirectly control the issuer jointly and severally
liable with the issuer. Id. § 15, 15 U.S.C. § 77o (1976); Securities Exchange Act of
1934, § 20, 15 U.S.C. § 78t (1976).
12. Securities Act of 1933, § 11(a)(4), (5), 15 U.S.C. § 77k(a)(4), (5) (1976). A
sale of registered securities to the public involves a number of different parties. The
issuer, desiring to raise capital through a sale of securities, contacts an underwriting
firm and secures its willingness to participate in the offering. This underwriting firm,
known as the "managing underwriter," conducts a thorough investigation of the
issuer and participates in the preparation of the registration statement covering the
securities to be offered along with the issuer's counsel and independent accounting
firm. The managing underwriter also contacts other underwriting firms who agree to
participate in the underwriting syndicate. Typically, these agreements are embodied
in letters of intent, which are not binding on the parties. Once the registration
becomes effective, the underwriting agreement is signed between the underwriters
and the issuer. This agreement is binding and commits the underwriters to the issue.
Several days later the closing takes place and the underwriters actually purchase the
securities from the issuer. In the actual offering, an underwriter acts as either a
retailer or a wholesaler, depending on the type of underwriting. In a "firm commit-
ment" underwriting the underwriter acts as a wholesaler, actually purchasing the
securities from the issuer and assuming the risk of sale to the investing public. In a
"best efforts" underwriting the underwriter acts as a retailer, agreeing to use his best
efforts to sell the securities for the issuer but not agreeing to purchase any unsold
portion of the issue. For a general discussion of the mechanics of a public offering and
the various types of underwriting arrangements, see Freund & Hacker, Cutting Up
the Humble Pie: A Practical Approach to Apportioning Litigation Risks Among
Underwriters, 48 St. John's L. Rev. 461, 464-68 (1974).
13. Underwriters make their profit from the "gross spread," which is the differ-
ence between the price they pay to the issuer for the securities and the price at which
they sell the securities to the public. The more successful the offering, the more
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10(b) is joint and several, 14 however, and once the possibility of civil
liability under these sections is raised, the groups' interests become
sharply antithetical. Damages awarded in federal securities cases can
be substantial, 5 and even crushing.' 6 Frequently, therefore, outside
assured the profit. See Freund & Hacker, supra note 12, at 466; Comment, Section
11 of the Securities Act: The Unresolved Dilemma of Participating Underwriters, 40
Fordham L. Rev. 869, 874-78 (1972).
14. Securities Act of 1933, § 11(f), 15 U.S.C. § 77k(f) (1976) ("All or any one or
more of the persons specified in [section 11(a)] shall be jointly and severally
liable .... ). Invoking the language of § 11, courts have judicially mandated joint
and several liability under § 10(b). See, e.g., In re Home-Stake Prod. Co. Sec. Litig.,
76 F.R.D. 351, 375 (N.D. Okla. 1977); deHaas v. Empire Petroleum Co., 286 F.
Supp. 809, 815-16 (D. Colo. 1968), aff'd in part, vacated in part on other grounds,
435 F.2d 1223 (10th Cir. 1970).
15. A plaintiff's damages for misrepresentation are measured according to the
"out-of-pocket rule." Elkind v. Liggett & Myers, Inc., 635 F.2d 156, 168 & n.24 (2d
Cir. 1980) (action under § 10(b)) (citing Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United States, 406
U.S. 128, 155 (1972)); Fershtman v. Schectman, 450 F.2d 1357, 1361 (2d Cir. 1971)
(actions under §§ 12 and 17(a) of the 1933 Act), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 1066 (1972);
Levine v. Seilon, Inc., 439 F.2d 328, 334 (2d Cir. 1971) (action under § 10(b)); In re
Gap Stores Sec. Litig., 79 F.R.D. 283, 298 (N.D. Cal. 1978) (action under § 11 of the
1933 Act); Tucker v. Arthur Andersen & Co., 67 F.R.D. 468, 482 (S.D.N.Y. 1975)
(action under § 10(b)); Mullaney, Theories of Measuring Damages in Security Cases
and the Effects of Damages on Liability, 46 Fordham L. Rev. 277, 281 (1977); Note,
The Measure of Damages in Rule 10b-5 Cases Involving Actively Traded Securities,
26 Stan. L. Rev. 371, 383-84 & n.65 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Measure of Dam-
ages]. Out-of-pocket damages are measured as the difference between the price paid
for the securities and the actual value of the securities at the time of the suit, or the
resale price of the securities if they have been resold by the plaintiff prior to his suit.
Reyos v. United States, 431 F.2d 1337, 1348 (10th Cir. 1970); Sarlie v. E.L. Bruce
Co., 265 F. Supp. 371, 376 (S.D.N.Y. 1967); Securities Act of 1933, § 11(e), 15
U.S.C. § 77k(e) (1976). Punitive damages are not recoverable under either the 1933
Act or the 1934 Act. Section 28(a) of the 1934 Act provides that "no person permitted
to maintain a suit for damages under the provisions of this chapter shall recover...
a total amount in excess of his actual damages." 15 U.S.C. § 78bb(a) (1976). This
section has been interpreted as barring punitive damages under both acts. Byrnes v.
Faulkner, Dawkins & Sullivan, 550 F.2d 1303, 1313 (2d Cir. 1977) (1934 Act);
Globus v. Law Research Serv., 418 F.2d 1276, 1283-87 (2d Cir. 1969) (1933 Act),
cert. denied, 397 U.S. 913 (1970). Consequential damages, however, are available.
Foster v. Financial Technology Inc., 517 F.2d 1068, 1071 (9th Cir. 1975) (a plaintiff
seeking consequential damages in an action under § 10(b) of the 1934 Act can recover
them if he establishes a causal nexus between the amounts claimed as consequential
damages and the defendant's wrongdoing with reasonable certainty); Madigan, Inc.
v. Goodman, 498 F.2d 233, 238-40 (7th Cir. 1974) ("good deal" of certainty); Zeller
v. Bogue Elec. Mfg. Corp., 476 F.2d 795, 803 (2d Cir.) (same), cert. denied, 414
U.S. 908 (1973). The concept of consequential damages has been used to recover
outlays of capital which are directly attributable to the defendant's fraudulent con-
duct. Madigan, Inc. v. Goodman, 498 F.2d at 238-39.
16. Mullaney, supra note 15, at 290-94; Measure of Damages, supra note 15, at
376-77. The problem of potentially crushing liability is obviated somewhat in suits
brought under § 11 of the 1933 Act. Section 11(e) provides, inter alia, that "[i]n no
event shall any underwriter ... be liable in any suit or as a consequence of suits
authorized under subsection (a) of this section for damages in excess of the total price
1981]
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defendants who are held liable in securities cases seek to shift their
liability for the plaintiffs damages to the inside defendants through
claims for contribution.17
Although a right to contribution clearly exists under sections 1118
and 10(b), 19 the method of apportioning the contribution shares
among defendants is unsettled. 20  Traditionally, contribution shares
at which the securities underwritten by him and distributed to the public were
offered to the public." 15 U.S.C. § 77k(e) (1976).
17. See infra notes 30, 34-37 and accompanying text. Section 11(f) of the 1933
Act precludes a defendant guilty of fraudulent misrepresentation from recovering
contribution from less culpable defendants. 15 U.S.C. § 77k(f) (1976).
18. Section 11(f) of the 1933 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 77k(f) (1976), expressly provides a
right of contribution for defendants in suits brought under that section. At early
common law, there was a prohibition against contribution among joint tortfeasors
dating from the English case of Merryweather v. Nixan, 101 Eng. Rep. 1337 (1799).
The English courts limited this prohibition to intentional tortfeasors, W. Prosser,
Handbook of the Law of Torts § 50, at 306 (4th ed. 1971), but the American courts
extended the ban on contribution to non-intentional tortfeasors as well. Union Stock
Yards Co. v. Chicago, B. & Q.R.R., 196 U.S. 217, 227-28 (1905); Public Serv. Ry. v.
Matteucci, 105 N.J.L. 114, 115-16, 143 A. 221, 221 (1928); Ruder, Multiple Defen-
dants in Securities Law Fraud Cases: Aiding and Abetting, Conspiracy, In Par
Delicto, Indemnification, and Contribution, 120 U. Pa. L. Rev. 597, 648 (1972);
Comment, Contribution and the Distribution of Loss Among Tortfeasors, 25 Am. U.
L. Rev. 203, 204-07 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Contribution]; Comment, Indemnity
and Contribution Among Joint Tortfeasors, 15 Hous. L. Rev. 1004, 1005 (1978)
[hereinafter cited as Indemnity]. By the middle of this century, the early common-
law rule against contribution among joint tortfeasors had been abolished by statute
or decisional law in many states. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 886A comment a,
at 338 (1979). In those states, the courts followed the maxim "Equality is equity" and
apportioned the contribution shares on a pro rata basis. Id. comment h, at 340; e.g.,
Warner v. Capital Transit Co., 162 F. Supp. 253, 255 (D.D.C. 1958); Russell v.
United States, 113 F. Supp. 353, 356 (M.D. Pa. 1953); Early Settlers Ins. Co. v.
Schweid, 221 A.2d 920, 923 (D.C. 1966); Reynolds v. Illinois Bell Tel. Co., 51 I11.
App. 2d 334, 339, 201 N.E.2d 322, 324-25 (1964); Scammon v. City of Saco, 247
A.2d 108, 112 (Me. 1968); Judson v. Peoples Bank & Trust Co., 17 N.J. 67, 94, 110
A.2d 24, 37 (1954); W. Prosser, supra, § 50, at 310.
19. The courts permit contribution in suits brought under § 10(b) of the 1934
Act, although such a right is not expressly provided in the section. E.g., Huddleston
v. Herman & MacLean, [1981 Transfer Binder] Fed. See. L. Rep. (CCH) 97,919,
at 90,677 (5th Cir. Mar. 9, 1981); Heizer Corp. v. Ross, 601 F.2d 330, 334 (7th Cir.
1979); Madigan, Inc. v. Goodman, 498 F.2d 233, 238 (7th Cir. 1974); Marrero v.
Abraham, 473 F. Supp. 1271, 1277-78 (E.D. La. 1979); Note, Globus: A Prolific
Generator of Nice Questions, 33 Ohio St. L.J. 898, 912-13 (1972).
20. Compare Wassel v. Eglowsky, 399 F. Supp. 1330, 1370 (D. Md. 1975) (pro
rata apportionment after grouping defendants by entity), afj'd per curiam, 542 F.2d
1235 (4th Cir. 1976), and Herzfeld v. Laventhol, Krekstein, Horwath & Horwath,
378 F. Supp. 112, 136 (S.D.N.Y. 1974) (pro rata apportionment), aff'd in part, rev'd
in part on other grounds, 540 F.2d 27 (2d Cir. 1976), with McLean v. Alexander, 449
F. Supp. 1251, 1276-77 (D. Del. 1978) (relative fault apportionment), rev'd on other
grounds, 599 F.2d 1190 (3d Cir. 1979), and Gould v. American-Hawaiian S.S. Co.,
387 F. Supp. 163, 170-71 (D. Del. 1974) (same, in dictum), vacated on other
grounds, 535 F.2d 761 (3d Cir. 1976).
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were apportioned on a pro rata basis-that is, equally among the
defendants without regard to individual fault.2' Recently, however,
some courts have moved away from the traditional rule toward ap-
portionment based upon the relative fault of the various defen-
dants.2 2 This Note proposes a method for the apportionment of con-
tribution shares in federal securities cases which synthesizes the pro
rata atid relative fault approaches. 23  After briefly reviewing the
mechanics of a securities offering, Part I examines the judicial treat-
ment of contribution and indemnification under the federal securities
acts. Part II concludes that section 10(b) of the 1934 Act and section
11 of the 1933 Act require different methods for the apportionment of
contribution shares in order to effectuate the deterrent policies that
are central to the two Acts.
I. SHIFrING THE BURDEN UNDER THE FEDERAL SECURITIES LAWS
With respect to the preparation of a registration statement for an
offering, the 1933 Act requires the underwriter and experts to conduct
a thorough investigation of the issuer's business affairs and makes the
underwriter or expert liable for any misrepresentations in the registra-
tion statement. 24 Even though the threat of civil liability encourages
the outsider to make a thorough investigation,2-5 the issuer is in a
position to conceal information from the undervriter or expert if it
has something to hide. The outsider may thus be actively prevented by
the issuer's duplicity from ensuring sufficiently accurate disclosure.20
21. Wassel v. Eglowsky, 399 F. Supp. 1330, 1370 (D. Md. 1975), aJfd per
curiam, 542 F.2d 1235 (4th Cir. 1976); e.g., Herzfeld v. Laventhol, Krekstein,
Horwath & Horwath, 378 F. Supp. 112, 136 (S.D.N.Y. 1974), afj'd in part, rev'd in
part on other grounds, 540 F.2d 27 (2d Cir. 1976); Globus, Inc. v. Law Research
Serv., 318 F. Supp. 955, 957 (S.D.N.Y. 1970), aff'd per curiam, 442 F.2d 1346 (2d
Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 941 (1971).
22. McLean v. Alexander, 449 F. Supp. 1251, 1268-77 (D. Del. 1978), rev'd on
other grounds, 599 F.2d 1190 (3d Cir. 1979); see Wassel v. Eglowsky, 399 F. Supp.
1330, 1366-70 (D. Md. 1975), aff'd per curiam. 542 F.2d 1235 (4th Cir. 1976); Could
v. American-Hawaiian S.S. Co., 387 F. Supp. 163, 168-72 (D. Del. 1974), vacated
on other grounds, 535 F.2d 761 (3d Cir. 1976); Feit v. Leasco Data Processing
Equip. Corp., 332 F. Supp. 544, 588 (E.D.N.Y. 1971).
23. Commentators in this field have assumed that one general rule on the appor-
tionment of contribution shares under the federal securities acts is appropriate in all
circumstances and have not attempted to draw distinctions in apportioning contribu-
tion shares under the various provisions of the federal securities acts which impose
civil liability. 3 L. Loss, Securities Regulation 1738 (2d ed. 1961); Adamski, Contri-
bution and Settlement in Multiparty Actions Under Rule 10b-5, 66 Iowa L. Rev. 533,
557-58 (1981); Ruder, supra note 18, at 650.
24. See supra note 6. Outside defendants can avoid this liability by proving their
"due diligence." See infra notes 121-23 and accompanying text.
25. See supra note 2 and accompanying text.
26. See McLean v. Alexander, 449 F. Supp. 1250, 1257-60 (D. Del. 1978), revd
on other grounds, 599 F.2d 1190 (3d Cir. 1979).
1981]
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An outside defendant who is found liable for such misrepresentation
will, quite naturally, seek to shift the burden onto the inside defen-
dants.2 7  Indeed, securities defendants in a variety of contexts have
consistently sought to shift their liability to other parties in the litiga-
tion through claims for indemnification or contribution. 28
The availability of either contribution or indemnification in a fed-
eral securities case is a matter to be determined under federal rather
than state law.2 9 These doctrines are equitable devices developed to
mitigate the harshness of joint and several liability. 30  Indemnifica-
tion permits a jointly liable defendant to shift all his liability to
another joint tortfeasor. 31 It is available in situations involving vicar-
ious liability32 or an express agreement of indemnification between
the parties. 33  Contribution, on the other hand, permits a jointly
liable defendant to shift a portion, but not all, of his liability to
another. 34 The right to contribution is not founded upon contract but
is based on principles of fundamental justice that require all jointly
27. Id. at 1265.
28. E.g., Heizer Corp. v. Ross, 601 F.2d 330, 331 (7th Cir. 1979) (corporate
shareholder defendant sought indemnification or contribution from its former presi-
dent, chief executive officer and director); Stratton Group v. Sprayregen, 466 F.
Supp. 1180, 1183 (S.D.N.Y. 1979) (corporate defendant sought contribution against
a partnership engaged in the practice of law which acted as legal counsel to the
corporation); Globus, Inc. v. Law Research Serv., 318 F. Supp. 955, 956 (S.D.N.Y.
1970) (underwriter sought contribution from issuing corporation), affd per curiam,
442 F.2d 1346 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 941 (1971).
29. Heizer Corp. v. Ross, 601 F.2d 330, 331 (7th Cir. 1979). The common-law
rules on contribution are therefore inapposite. See supra note 18.
30. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 886A comment c, at 338-39 (1979); see id. §
886B comment c, at 345-46. See generally W. Prosser, supra note 18, § 50 (contribu-
tion); id. § 51 (indemnification). Joint tortfeasors are jointly and severally liable for
the plaintiff's loss. Each individual tortfeasor is therefore liable for the entire amount
of the plaintiffs damages. See W. Prosser, supra note 18, § 47, at 297. Contribution
and indemnification are remedies which joint and severally liable defendants have
inter se. They do not affect the plaintiff's substantive right to sue any tortfeasor he
chooses and to seek execution from any tortfeasor against whom he obtains a judg-
ment. Contribution, supra note 18, at 203-04.
31. McLean v. Alexander, 449 F. Supp. 1251, 1256 (D. Del. 1978), rev'd on
other grounds, 599 F.2d 1190 (3d Cir. 1979); W. Prosser, supra note 18, § 51, at 310;
see Globus v. Law Research Serv., 287 F. Supp. 188, 199 (S.D.N.Y. 1968), aff'd in
part, rev'd in part on other grounds, 418 F.2d 1276 (2d Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397
U.S. 913 (1970).
32. W. Prosser, supra note 18, § 51, at 311.
33. Id. at 310.
34. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 886A comment 1, at 342 (1979); W. Prosser,
supra note 18, § 50, at 310; 2 S. Williston, Treatise on the Law of Contracts § 345, at
767 (3d ed. 1959). The defendant seeking contribution must establish that the party
from whom he seeks it is liable in tort to the same person for the same harm. Wassel
v. Eglowsky, 399 F. Supp. 1330, 1367 (D. Md. 1975), aff'd per curiam, 542 F.2d
1235 (4th Cir. 1976); W. Prosser, supra note 18, § 50, at 309.
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liable parties to bear a portion of the common liability.3 The de-
fendant who has been forced to discharge more than his share of the
liability may bring a claim for contribution against any other jointly
liable parties to compel reimbursement. 3 The losses arising out of the
joint liability are thus more evenly distributed among the responsible
defendants. 37
A. Indemnification
An outside defendant could at one time completely escape liability
for a violation of the federal securities acts through an indemnification
agreement.3 8 In the typical agreement, the inside and outside parties
agreed to indemnify each other for any acts or omissions giving rise to
liability. 39 Despite scholarly criticism,40 this practice was the rule in
35. Newport Air Park, Inc. v. United States, 419 F.2d 342, 346 (1st Cir. 1969);
Miller v. Miller, 62 Misc. 2d 755, 757, 310 N.Y.S.2d 18, 21 (Civ. Ct. 1970); Newman
v. Lefkowitz, 60 Misc. 2d 104, 107, 301 N.Y.S.2d 738, 741 (Dist. Ct. 1969); Nation-
wide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Minnifield, 213 Va. 797, 800, 196 S.E.2d 75, 77-78 (1973).
36. 2 S. Williston, supra note 34, § 345, at 772, 775. Contribution is an inchoate
right which ripens into a cause of action when one party pays more than his share of
the common liability. Id. at 775; accord Prisbrey v. Noble, 505 F.2d 170, 176 (10th
Cir. 1974); Southern Ry. v. State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co., 357 F. Supp. 810, 812
(N.D. Ga. 1972), aff'd, 477 F.2d 49 (5th Cir. 1973); Kantlehner v. United States, 279
F. Supp. 122, 128 (E.D.N.Y. 1967). The federal rules of civil procedure, however,
permit contribution claims to be brought before one party has been proven liable to
another for contribution. Fed. R. Civ. P. 13(g), 14(a); see infra note 52 and accom-
panying text.
37. Of course, the parties who are potentially liable could agree among them-
selves in advance of litigation to apportion contribution shares in the event of
liability. 2 S. Williston, supra note 34, § 345, at 769; Douglas & Bates, The Federal
Securities Act of 1933, 43 Yale L.J. 171, 178-79 (1933). This private agreement is
enforceable if it is not contrary to public policy. See 2 S. Williston, supra note 34, §
345, at 769-70. Several commentators have suggested this approach to the problem of
apportioning contribution shares under the federal securities acts. Freund & Hacker,
supra note 12, 480-95; Comment, Section 11 of the Securities Act-A Proposal For
Allocating Liability, 45 Wash. L. Rev. 95, 116-28 (1970). This Note is concerned
with the apportionment of contribution shares in the absence of such a private
agreement on the matter.
38. Note, Indemnification of Underwriters and Section 11 of the Securities Act of
1933, 72 Yale L.J. 406, 407 (1962) [hereinafter cited as Indemnification of Under-
writers].
39. For the text of a typical indemnification agreement, see Globus v. Law
Research Serv., 418 F.2d 1276, 1287 n.14 (2d Cir. 1969), cert. denicd, 397 U.S. 913
(1970).
40. 3 L. Loss, supra note 23, at 1831 ("Indemnification defeats pro tanto the
statutory provision on contribution. And it is hostile to the in terrorem effect in-
tended for § 11; negligence in the preparation of the registration statement was made
a basis of civil liability largely in order to promote careful adherence to the statutory
requirements." (footnote omitted)).
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the securities industry 41 prior to the 1968 decision in Globus v. Law
Research Service.42
In Globus, the district court refused to enforce an indemnification
agreement between two defendants on the ground that an agreement
that absolved a defendant guilty of a knowing violation of the federal
securities acts was contrary to public policy and therefore unenforce-
able. 43 The court reasoned that the threat of civil liability that could
not be avoided by contract was necessary in order to encourage out-
side defendants to adhere to the statutory requirements of thorough
investigation and disclosure.4 4 The Second Circuit affirmed, but it
stopped short of propounding a general rule barring indemnification
in all circumstances, noting that it was only considering a situation in
which the defendant seeking indemnification was himself guilty of
more than mere negligence. 45
The Second Circuit's decision in Globus thus left open the possibil-
ity that a merely negligent party could obtain indemnification from
one significantly more culpable.46 This possibility proved to be illu-
sory, however, as courts applying the Globus rule in subsequent in-
demnification cases routinely held that the party seeking indemnifica-
41. Id. at 1834-35.
42. 287 F. Supp. 188 (S.D.N.Y. 1968), aff'd in part, rev'd in part on other
grounds, 418 F.2d 1276 (2d Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 913 (1970). The
defendants in Globus were the issuer, its president and the underwriter involved in
an offering of one hundred thousand shares of Law Research Service, Inc. They were
all found liable for having circulated in connection with the stock sale an advertise-
ment that contained a misrepresentation in volation of § 10(b) of the 1934 Act and §
17(a) of the 1933 Act. Id. at 191. The underwriter had entered into a standard
indemnification agreement with the issuer and sought by way of a cross-claim to
enforce this agreement and shift its liability for the plaintiff's losses onto the issuer
and its president. Id. at 198-99.
43. Id. at 199.
44. Id. ("The purpose of the federal securities acts is to insure that the public
investor, including particularly small investors such as the plaintiffs here, will obtain
the benefit of a thorough investigation of the facts set forth in a prospectus or offering
circular, not only by the issuer but also by the underwriter, so that prospective
investors will have access to the truth. If an underwriter were to be permitted to
escape liability for its own misconduct by obtaining indemnity from the issuers, it
would have less of an incentive to conduct a thorough investigation and to be truthful
in the prospectus distributed under its name, than it would be if the indemnity was
unenforceable under such circumstances."); accord State Mut. Life Assurance Co. v.
Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co., 49 F.R.D. 202, 213 (S.D.N.Y. 1969).
45. 418 F.2d at 1287-88.
46. See Wassel v. Eglowsky, 399 F. Supp. 1330, 1366 (D. Md. 1975), aJj'd per
curiam, 542 F.2d 1235 (4th Cir. 1976) (dictum); Gould v. American-Hawaiian S.S.
Co., 387 F. Supp. 163, 167 (D. Del. 1974) (same), vacated on other grounds, 535
F.2d 761 (3d Cir. 1976); Herzfeld v. Laventhol, Krekstein, Horwath & Horwath,
378 F. Supp. 112, 135 (S.D.N.Y. 1974) (same), aff'd in part, rev'd in part on other
grounds, 540 F.2d 27 (2d Cir. 1976); Ruder, supra note 18, at 651-59.
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tion was guilty of more than ordinary negligence. 47  Adopting a
stricter approach, another line of cases concluded that indemnifica-
tion would not be permitted under the federal securities acts as a
matter of law, regardless of the culpability of the party seeking it.48
The rule denying indemnification as a matter of law is consistent ith
the policies underlying the federal securities acts. 49  Enforcing an
indemnification agreement in favor of a negligent outside defendant
would tend to encourage a less thorough investigation of the issuer,
and consequently less than satisfactory disclosure, by removing the
penalty for a negligent investigation. 50 Deprived of indemnification
by Globus and its progeny, outside defendants in federal securities
lawsuits may nevertheless obtain the benefits of contribution.-'
B. Contribution
An express right to contribution52 is granted in section 11 of the
47. E.g., McLean v. Alexander, 449 F. Supp. 1251, 1267 (D. Del. 1978), rev'd
on other grounds, 599 F.2d 1190 (3d Cir. 1979); Wassel v. Eglowsky, 399 F. Supp.
1330, 1366 (D. Md. 1975), af'd per curiam, 542 F.2d 1235 (4th Cir. 1976); Tucker v.
Arthur Andersen & Co., [1973-1974 Transfer Binder] Fed. See. L. Rep. (CCH)
94,544, at 95,868 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 25, 1974); Herzfeld v. Laventhol, Krekstein,
Horwath & Horwath, 378 F. Supp. 112, 135 (S.D.N.Y. 1974), aff'd in part, rev'd in
part on other grounds, 540 F.2d 27 (2d Cir. 1976).
48. E.g., Laventhol, Krekstein, Horwath & Horwath v. Horwitch, [1981 Trans-
fer Binder] Fed. See. L. Rep. (CCH) 97,810, at 90,062 (9th Cir. Dec. 22, 1980);
Heizer Corp. v. Ross, 601 F.2d 330, 334-35 (7th Cir. 1979); Odette v. Shearson,
Hammill & Co., 394 F. Supp. 946, 956-57 (S.D.N.Y. 1975); Gould v. American-Ha-
wailan S.S. Co., 387 F. Supp. 163, 168 (D. Del. 1974), vacated on other grounds,
535 F.2d 761 (3d Cir. 1976); Alexander & Baldwin, Inc. v. Peat, Marwick, Mitchell
& Co., 385 F. Supp. 230, 237-38 (S.D.N.Y. 1974).
49. The commentators generally agree that indemnification is undesirable in a
federal securities lawsuit. 3 L. Loss, supra note 23, at 1831-32; Ruder, supra note 18,
at 651-59; Indemnification of Underwriters, supra note 38, at 411-12.
50. See supra note 44.
51. E.g., Laventhol, Krekstein, Horwath & Horwath v. Horwitch, [1981 Trans-
fer Binder] Fed. See. L. Rep. (CCH) 97,810, at 90,060 (9th Cir. Dec. 22, 1980);
Heizer Corp. v. Ross, 601 F.2d 330, 331 (7th Cir. 1979); McLean v. Alexander, 449
F. Supp. 1251, 1255 (D. Del. 1978), rev'd on other grounds, 599 F.2d 1190 (3d Cir.
1979); Wassel v. Eglowsky, 399 F. Supp. 1330, 1335 (D. Md. 1975), affd per
curiam, 542 F.2d 1235 (4th Cir. 1976); Odette v. Shearson, Hammill & Co., 394 F.
Supp. 946, 957-58 (S.D.N.Y. 1975); Gould v. American-Hawaiian S.S. Co., 387 F.
Supp. 163, 166 (D. Del. 1974), vacated on other grounds, 535 F.2d 761 (3d Cir.
1976); Alexander & Baldwin, Inc. v. Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co., 385 F. Supp.
230, 233 (S.D.N.Y. 1974); Herzfeld v. Laventhol, Krekstein, Horwath & Horwath,
378 F. Supp. 112, 132-33 (S.D.N.Y. 1974), aff'd in part, rev'd in part on other
grounds, 540 F.2d 27 (2d Cir. 1976).
52. There are three situations in which a claim for contribution may be asserted
in the context of a federal securities lawsuit. A defendant may bring a cross-claim for
contribution against another defendant in the action when the plaintiff has sued
both. E.g., Sherlee Land v. Commonwealth United Corp., [1972-1973 Transfer
1981]
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1933 Act.53 In addition, the courts have implied a right to contribu-
tion in actions brought under section 10(b) of the 1934 Act.54 Unlike
indemnification, which drastically reduced the incentives to investi-
gate,55 contribution enhances the deterrent effect of civil liability
under the federal securities acts. Because every party involved in an
offering may be liable for contribution claims, each has an incentive
Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 93,749, at 93,274-75 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 16, 1973):
Johns Hopkins Univ. v. Hutton, [1966-1967 Transfer Binder] Fed. See. L. Rep.
(CCH) 91,810, at 95,761 (D. Md. May 2, 1966); Fed. R. Civ. P. 13(g). A defendant
in the original action may assert a third-party claim for contribution against an
outside party who was not named in the plaintiffs complaint. E.g., B & B Inv. Club
v. Kleinert's Inc., 391 F. Supp. 720, 724 (E.D. Pa. 1975); Liggett & Myers, Inc. v.
Bloomfield, 380 F. Supp. 1044, 1046 (S.D.N.Y. 1974); Getter v. R.G. Dickinson &
Co., 366 F. Supp. 559, 569 (S.D. Iowa 1973); Union Paving Co. v. Thomas, 9
F.R.D. 612, 613 (E.D. Pa. 1949); Fed. R. Civ. P. 14(a). Finally, a non-settling
defendant who has paid a judgment may assert a claim for contribution against those
defendants who have settled with the plaintiff prior to the judgment. E.g., Laven.
thol, Krekstein, Horwath & Horwath v. Horwitch, [1981 Transfer Binder] Fed. See.
L. Rep. (CCH) 97,810, at 90,060 (9th Cir. Dec. 22, 1980); Herzfeld v. Laventhol,
Krekstein, Horwath & Horwath, 540 F.2d 27, 29 (2d Cir. 1976); McLean v. Alexan-
der, 449 F. Supp. 1251, 1274 (D. Del. 1978), rev'd on other grounds, 599 F.2d 1190
(3d Cir. 1979); Muth v. Dechert, Price & Rhoads, 391 F. Supp. 935, 939 (E.D. Pa.
1975); Altman v. Liberty Equities Corp., 54 F.R.D. 620, 624-25 (S.D.N.Y. 1972). A
settlement does not extinguish the settling defendant's liability for contribution to a
non-settling defendant in the event that an adverse judgment is procured against the
non-settling defendant. Laventhol, Krekstein, Horwath & Horwath v. Horwitch,
[1981 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. at 90,061; McLean v. Alexander, 449 F.
Supp. at 1267; Muth v. Dechert, Price & Rhoads, 391 F. Supp. at 939; Altman v.
Liberty Equities Corp., 54 F.R.D. at 624; Note, Contribution Under the Federal
Securities Laws, 1975 Wash. U. L.Q. 1256, 1292-303 [hereinafter cited as Federal
Contribution]. This rule is criticized in Adamski, supra note 23, at 542-44.
53. Securities Act of 1933, § 11(f), 15 U.S.C. § 77k(f) (1976). Section 11(f)
provides in pertinent part: "All or any one or more of the persons specified in
subsection (a) of this section shall be jointly and severally liable, and every person
who becomes liable to make any payment under this section may recover contribu-
tion as in cases of contract from any person who, if sued separately, would have been
liable to make the same payment ...." Id. Express contribution provisions contain-
ing language similar to that of § 11(f) are also found in § 9(e) and § 18(b) of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78i(e), r(b) (1976).
54. E.g., Heizer Corp. v. Ross, 601 F.2d 330, 334 (7th Cir. 1979); Madigan, Inc.
v. Goodman, 498 F.2d 233, 237-38 (7th Cir. 1974); Marrero v. Abraham, 473 F.
Supp. 1271, 1277-78 (W.D. La. 1979); Stratton Group v. Sprayregen, 466 F. Supp.
1180, 1185 (S.D.N.Y. 1979); McLean v. Alexander, 449 F. Supp. 1251, 1274 (D. Del.
1978), rev'd on other grounds, 599 F.2d 1190 (3d Cir. 1979); Odette v. Shearson,
Hammill & Co., 394 F. Supp. 946, 954 (S.D.N.Y. 1975); B & B Inv. Club v.
Kleinert's Inc., 391 F. Supp. 720, 724 (E.D. Pa. 1975); Getter v. R.G. Dickinson &
Co., 366 F. Supp. 559, 569 (S.D. Iowa 1973); Globus, Inc. v. Law Research Serv.,
318 F. Supp. 955, 957 (S.D.N.Y. 1970), affd per curiam, 442 F.2d 1346 (2d Cir),
cert. denied, 404 U.S. 941 (1971); deHaas v. Empire Petroleum Co., 286 F. Supp.
809 (D. Colo. 1968), afj'd in part, rev'd in part on other grounds, 435 F.2d 1223
(10th Cir. 1970).
55. See supra note 44.
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to comply with the requirements of investigation and accurate disclo-
sure.
56
Once a right to contribution has been established, the problem of
apportioning the total liability among the defendants must be ad-
dressed.57 Contribution shares may be apportioned among the de-
fendants either equally, on a pro rata basis,-s or unequally, on the
basis of relative fault.59 Under the pro rata method of apportion-
ment, the total liability to the plaintiff is divided by the number of
defendants, and equal shares are apportioned to each defendant.Go
Under relative fault apportionment, each defendant's share of the
56. Laventhol, Krekstein, Horwath & Horwath v. Horwitch, [1981 Transfer
Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 97,810, at 90,061 (9th Cir. Dec. 22, 1980); Heizer
Corp. v. Ross, 601 F.2d 330, 332 (7th Cir. 1979); Odette v. Shearson, Hammill &
Co., 394 F. Supp. 946, 958 (S.D.N.Y. 1975); Gould v. American-Hawaiian S.S. Co.,
387 F. Supp. 163, 169 (D. Del. 1974), vacated on other grounds, 535 F.2d 761 (3d
Cir. 1976); Alexander & Baldwin, Inc. v. Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co., 385 F.
Supp. 230, 238 (S.D.N.Y. 1974).
57. Gould v. American-Hawaiian S.S. Co., 387 F. Supp. 163, 169 (D. Del.
1974), vacated on other grounds, 535 F.2d 761 (3d Cir. 1976).
58. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 886A comment h, at 340 (1979); see supra
note 18.
59. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 886A comment h, at 340 (1979). Today, the
general rule of pro rata apportionment of contribution shares among tortfeasors is
rapidly being supplanted by a rule of contribution based upon the relative fault of the
defendants. Id. Although the roots of the relative fault movement can be traced back
to 1939 when the National Conference on Uniform State Laws drafted the first
Uniform Contribution Among Tortfeasors Act, authorizing consideration of the rela-
tive degrees of fault among the defendants in determining their shares of the common
liability, the statute was largely ignored by the states and the trend did not begin in
earnest until Dole v. Dow Chem. Co., 30 N.Y.2d 143, 282 N.E.2d 288, 331 N.Y.S.2d
382 (1972). Restatement (Second) of Torts § 886A comment h, at 340 (1979). Admin-
istratively, this method of apportionment is more difficult to apply because degrees of
fault must be quantified, but in appropriate circumstances it undoubtedly yields
more equitable results. Id. This evolution of the law toward a rule of relative fault
apportionment has been the subject of considerable scholarly attention. Appel &
Michael, Contribution Among Joint Tortfeasors in Illinois: An Opportunity for
Legislative and Judicial Cooperation, 10 Loy. Chi. L.J. 169 (1979) (Illinois law);
Comment, Dole v. Dow Chemical Co.: A Leading Decision-But Where, 39 Brook-
lyn L. Rev. 330 (1972) (same); Comment, Relative Contribution Among Tortleasors:
Time for Judicial Change of the Washington Rule?, 11 Gonz. L. Rev. 179 (1975)
(Washington law); Indemnity, supra note 18 (Texas law); Comment, The Case for
Comparative Contribution in Florida, 30 U. Miami L. Rev. 713 (1976) (Florida
law); Note, The New Right of Relative Contribution: Dole v. Dow Chemical Co., 37
Alb. L. Rev. 154 (1972) (New York law); Note, Contribution Among Joint Tort-
feasors, 12 Ga. L. Rev. 553 (1978) (Georgia law); Note, Contribution Among Negli-
gent Tortfeasors: The New Rule and Beyond, 55 Neb. L. Rev. 383 (1976) (Nebraska
law); Note, A Judicial Rule of Contribution Among Tortfeasors in Illinois, 1978 U.
Ill. L.F. 633 (Illinois law).
60. Wassel v. Eglowsky, 399 F. Supp. 1330, 1370 (D. Md. 1975), aff'd per
curiam, 542 F.2d 1235 (4th Cir. 1976); W. Prosser, supra note 18, § 50, at 310.
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total liability is dependent upon its respective responsibility for bring-
ing about the plaintiffs injury.61
1. Pro Rata Apportionment
The pro rata method is the traditional approach for apportioning
contribution shares among defendants under the federal securities
acts. 2 When the issue of contribution was first addressed in federal
securities cases, comparative fault was considered in tort law to be an
unworkable mechanism for apportioning liability among defen-
dants.6 3 Pro rata apportionment, on the other hand, had the advan-
tages of predictability of results and ease of application.64 As a result,
the earliest federal securities contribution case65 applied the pro rata
rule as a matter of course, without an extended discussion.06
Moreover, the language in the express contribution provision of
section 11 of the 1933 Act could be read to indicate that Congress had
intended contribution in federal securities cases to be apportioned on
a pro rata basis. Section 11 provides that "every person who becomes
liable to make any payment under this section may recover contribu-
tion as in cases of contract."'6 7 Commentators advocating pro rata
apportionment have argued that this language was intended to en-
graft the common-law rule of pro rata contribution in contract cases
onto federal securities law. 8
61. Dole v. Dow Chem. Co., 30 N.Y.2d 143, 153, 282 N.E.2d 288, 295, 331
N.Y.S.2d 382, 391-92 (1972); Restatement (Second) of Torts § 886A comment h, at
340 (1979).
62. Wassel v. Eglowsky, 399 F. Supp. 1330, 1370 (D. Md. 1975), aff'd per
curiam, 542 F.2d 1235 (4th Cir. 1976); Herzfeld v. Laventhol, Krekstein, Horwath
& Horwath, 378 F. Supp. 112, 136 (S.D.N.Y. 1974), aff'd in part, rev'd in part on
other grounds, 540 F.2d 27 (2d Cir. 1976); Globus, Inc. v. Law Research Serv., 318
F. Supp. 955, 957 (S.D.N.Y. 1970), aff'd per curiam, 442 F.2d 1346 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 404 U.S. 941 (1971).
63. Note, Contribution and Indemnity Among Tortfeasors, 31 Mont. L. Rev. 69,
71 (1969); see Warner v. Capital Transit Co., 162 F. Supp. 253, 255 (D.D.C. 1958);
Consolidated Coach Corp. v. Burge, 245 Ky. 631, 635-36, 54 S.W.2d 16, 18-19
(1932).
64. Herzfeld v. Laventhol, Krekstein, Horwath & Horwath, 378 F. Supp. 112,
136 (S.D.N.Y. 1974), affd in part, rev'd in part on other grounds, 540 F.2d 27 (2d
Cir. 1976); 3 L. Loss, supra note 23, at 1738 (quoting with approval Douglas &
Bates, supra note 37, at 178-81).
65. Globus, Inc. v. Law Research Serv., 318 F. Supp. 955 (S.D.N.Y. 1970), aJj'd
per curiam, 442 F.2d 1346 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 941 (1971).
66. Id. at 957-58.
67. Securities Act of 1933, § 11(f), 15 U.S.C. § 77k(f) (1976); see supra note 53.
68. 3 L. Loss, supra note 23, at 1737-38; Douglas & Bates, supra note 37, at
178-80; Ruder, supra note 18, at 650. In contrast to joint tortfeasors, see supra note
18, at common law a co-obligor who paid more than his proportionate share of the
joint liability was entitled to contribution. J. Calamari & J. Perillo, The Law of
Contracts § 20-6, at 750 (2d ed. 1977). The general rule for apportionment in such
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Pro rata contribution, however, did not always yield equitable
results. Although it mitigated the common-law "no contribution"
rule,6 9 it required all liable defendants to bear an equal share of the
burden.70 In situations involving a significant disparity in the relative
culpability of the defendants, a more equitable distribution of the
liability can be achieved by apportioning contribution shares on the
basis of culpability.71
The first assault on the equal apportionment rule was indirect,
combining the pro rata rule with the so-called "entity" theory of
liability. 72 In Feit v. Leasco Data Processing Equipment Corp.73 and
Wassel v. Eglowsky,74 the courts recognized that certain defendants
were significantly less culpable than the others.7 5  One reading of the
1971 decision in Feit suggests that it may have been the first federal
securities case to employ the entity approach. Four defendants, the
issuer and three directors, were found liable for violating section 11 of
the 1933 Act. 76 Instead of holding each defendant jointly and sever-
ally liable to the plaintiff, it appeared that the court split the defen-
cases is that "all should contribute equally to the discharge of the common liability."
2 S. Williston, supra note 34, § 345, at 767 (quoting Thomas v. Malco Refineries,
Inc., 214 F.2d 884, 885 (10th Cir. 1954)); accord 1 G. Palmer, The Law of Restitu-
tion § 1.5, at 29 (1978).
69. See supra note 18.
70. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 886A comment h, at 340 (1979).
71. Kelly v. Long Island Lighting Co., 31 N.Y.2d 25, 29, 286 N.E.2d 241, 243,
334 N.Y.S.2d 851, 854 (1972) ("To require a joint tort-feasor who is, for instance,
10% causally negligent to pay the same amount as a co-tort-feasor who is 90%
causally negligent seems inequitable and unjust. The fairer rule, we believe, is to
distribute the loss in proportion to the allocable concurring fault."); Bielski v.
Schulze, 16 Wis. 2d 1, 9, 114 N.W.2d 105, 109 (1962) ("It is difficult to justify, either
on a layman's sense of justice or on natural justice, why a joint tort-feasor who is five
percent causally negligent should only recover 50 percent of the amount he paid to
the plaintiff from a co-tort-feasor who is 95 percent causally negligent, and con-
versely why the defendant who is found five percent causally negligent should be
required to pay 50 percent of the loss by way of reimbursement to the co-tort-feasor
who is 95 percent negligent.").
72. Fischer, Contribution in 10b-5 Actions, 33 Bus. Law. 1821, 1838-40 (1978).
State courts have occasionally relied on an entity theory to apportion liability. E.g.,
Lutzv. Boas, 40 Del. Ch. 130, 136, 176 A. 2d 853, 857-58 (1961); McCabe v. Century
Theatres Inc., 25 A.D.2d 154, 158, 268 N.Y.S.2d 48, 52, ajfd mere., 18 N.Y.2d 648,
219 N.E.2d 426, 273 N.Y.S.2d 74 (1966); Bundy v. New York, 23 A.D.2d 392,
395-96, 261 N.Y.S.2d 221, 224-25 (1965).
73. 332 F. Supp. 544 (E.D.N.Y. 1971).
74. 399 F. Supp. 1330 (D. Md. 1975), aff'd per curiam, 542 F.2d 1235 (4th Cir.
1976).
75. Id. at 1370; see Feit v. Leasco Data Processing Equip. Corp., 332 F. Supp. at
575, 588. The opinion in McLean v. Alexander, 449 F. Supp. 1251 (D. Del. 1978),
reo'd on other grounds, 599 F.2d 1190 (3d Cir. 1979), indicates that the court in Feit
followed the entity theory, although that is not explicit from the Feit opinion. Id. at
1275.
76. 332 F. Supp. at 588.
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dants into two separate entities-one comprised only of the issuer and
the other, the three directors. Each entity, as opposed to each individ-
ual, was then held jointly and severally liable for the plaintiff's
losses. 7
7
Wassel, decided four years later, was the first federal securities case
to expressly adopt and explain the entity theory.78 The defendants in
Wassel were the two sellers and the former corporate counsel for the
issuer.79 The Wassel court, pursuant to an explicit recognition that one
seller was less culpable than the other, 0 classified the sellers as one
entity and the corporate counsel as another, and held each entity
responsible for half the plaintiff's damages.8'
The entity approach led to more equitable results in these two
cases, but it was a half measure at best. Groping toward a rule of
equitable apportionment, these courts adopted an expedient but did
not elaborate on the rationale behind it. It was unlikely that courts
which at least in theory were still following the pro rata rule of
apportionment could have devised another way to prevent the in-
equity.
2. Relative Fault Apportionment
Apportionment on a relative fault basis has been accepted by many
jurisdictions as a more equitable method of allocating liability among
joint tortfeasors.82  Although some courts predicted it would be too
difficult to administer, 3 the states that have adopted relative fault
have found it well worth the slight additional difficulty of taking the
facts of each case into account.8 4
The growing acceptance of relative fault apportionment in general
tort law by the mid-1970's sparked a concomitant trend away from
strict pro rata contribution in federal securities law.85 The first ex-
77. Id. In apportioning liability, the Feit court wrote, "[t]he issuer, Leasco, and
these three directors are jointly and severally liable to the class." Id. To indicate that
the four defendants had been made jointly and severally liable for all the damages,
the sentence would arguably have had to read: "The issuer, Leasco, and these three
directors are each jointly and severally liable to the class." But see McLean v.
Alexander, 449 F. Supp. 1251, 1275 & n.82 (D. Del. 1978) (the court asserted that
the less culpable defendants in Feit paid substantially less than an equal share of the
liability, but there is no indication of this in the Feit decision), rev'd on other
grounds, 599 F.2d 1190 (3d Cir. 1979).
78. 399 F. Supp. at 1368-70.
79. Id. at 1336-37.
80. Id. at 1370 (one seller's fault was derivative of the other's).
81. Id.; see id. at 1366 (counsel's conduct may have posed greater danger).
82. See supra note 59.
83. See, e.g., Warner v. Capital Transit Co., 162 F. Supp. 253, 255 (D.D.C.
1958); Consolidated Coach Corp. v. Burge, 245 Ky. 631, 635-36, 54 S.W.2d 16, 18
(1932).
84. See supra note 71.
85. See supra note 22 and accompanying text.
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press recognition of relative fault apportionment in a securities case
appeared in dictum in Gould v. American-Hawaiian Steamship
Co.86 The Gould court determined that the phrase "as in cases of
contract" in the express contribution sections of the federal securities
acts did not mandate pro rata apportionment. 87 As mentioned above,
the phrase had been interpreted as requiring apportionment accord-
ing to the pro rata rule, which was generally applied in contract cases
at the time the federal securities acts were enacted. 88 The court in
Gould noted, however, that the phrase was not defined in the legisla-
tive history, 89 and concluded that the contribution sections were in-
tended to avoid the tort rule barring contribution among joint tort-
feasors 0 rather than to preclude equitable considerations in awarding
contribution in securities cases.9"
The movement toward an equitable distribution of liability among
securities defendants came of age with the express adoption of relative
fault apportionment in McLean v. Alexander.9 - In McLean, an ac-
86. 387 F. Supp. 163 (D. Del. 1974), vacated on other grounds, 535 F.2d 761 (3d
Cir. 1976). The plaintiff class in Gould alleged and proved a violation of § 14(a) of
the 1934 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78n(a) (1976), arising out of a false and misleading proxy
solicitation issued in connection with a merger. 387 F. Supp. at 165. Each of three
sets of defendants urged the court to adopt a different method for the apportionment
of contribution shares. Id. at 169-70. Many of the defendants had settled with the
plaintiffs prior to the trial. These defendants argued that contribution shares should
be apportioned on the basis of relative fault. Id. The corporate defendants argued for
contribution based on the benefits received by the individual defendants in the
transaction. Id. The non-settling defendants were found liable and cross-claimed
against the settling defendants for indemnity or in the alternative for contribution,
id. at 165-66, to be apportioned by the pro rata method. Id. at 169-70. They argued
that the phrase "as in cases of contract" found in the contribution sections of the 1933
Act and the 1934 Act was intended to codify the pro rata method of apportionment
that was the rule for contract cases at common law. Id. at 170. The court denied the
cross-claim for indemnity as contrary to the deterrent policy of the federal securities
acts. Id. at 168; see supra note 4 and accompanying text. It held, however, that
contribution was available under § 14(a) of the 1934 Act, citing the compatibility of a
system of contribution and the policies behind § 14(a), 387 F. Supp. at 169, and the
"'recent trend in the law favoring contribution." Id. (citing Kohr v. Allegheny
Airlines, 504 F.2d 400 (7th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 978 (1975), and
Globus, Inc. v. Law Research Serv., 318 F. Supp. 955 (S.D.N.Y. 1970), aJf'd per
curiam, 442 F.2d 1346 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 941 (1971)).
87. 387 F. Supp. at 170.
88. See supra notes 67-68 and accompanying text.
89. 387 F. Supp. at 170. The drafters of the federal securities acts were more
concerned with imposing liability than with apportioning it. See H.R. Rep. No.
1838, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 37 (1934); S. Doc. No. 185, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 18 (1934);
H.R. Rep. No. 1383, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 25 (1934); S. Rep. No. 792, 73d Cong., 2d
Sess. 21 (1934); H.R. Rep. No. 152, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. 26 (1933); H.R. Rep. No.
85, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. 9 (1933); S. Rep. No. 47, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. 5 (1933).
90. See supra note 18.
91. 387 F. Supp. at 170.
92. 449 F. Supp. 1251 (D. Del. 1978), rev'd on other grounds, 599 F.2d 1190 (3d
Cir. 1979). The plaintiff in McLean brought an action under § 10(b) of the 1934 Act
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counting firm, having been held liable for violation of section 10(b),
moved for an apportionment of contribution shares on the basis of
relative fault. 93 The firm argued that the issuer's fraudulent activities
were chiefly responsible for the plaintiff's losses, 9 4 and therefore the
issuer should bear the greater burden of liability. 5 The court con-
cluded that the liability of the outside defendant was in a sense
derivative because the inside sellers had supplied the outside defen-
dant with false information and had then actively concealed the true
nature of the transactions in question.9 Determining that applica-
tion of either the entity theory or pro rata apportionment would,
under the circumstances, result in substantial inequity, 7 the court
observed that "[iln this case there was a vast difference between
defendants in the degrees of their wrongdoing and the damages ought
to reflect that fact."9 8
The trend toward the apportionment of contribution shares based
upon relative fault has been generally well received by the commenta-
tors.99 The exact state of the law, however, is difficult to assess. The
against the inside sellers of a corporation that he had purchased and the accounting
firm that had handled the transaction, claiming that the defendants had duped him
into purchasing the corporation by supplying him with misleading information. Id.
at 1255-56.
93. Id. at 1265. The inside sellers had settled with the plaintiff, id. at 1255, but
the accounting firm was found liable at trial by reason of its failure to perform a
thorough audit. Id. at 1276. They performed what amounted to a cursory audit and
as a result certified the accounts receivable covering these purported sales as "consid-
ered fully collectible." Id. at 1256.
94. Id. at 1256-60. These inside sellers had induced both the plaintiff and the
accounting firm to believe that certain purchase orders represented firm sales, when
in fact the underlying transactions were merely consignments. Id. The inside sellers
perpetuated their fraud during the audit by causing to be sent to the accountants
telegrams which appeared to confirm purchases of the corporation's product, when
in fact no such purchases existed. Id. 1259-60. In one instance a salesman forged a
telegram purporting to confirm a sale. Id. at 1260.
95. Id. at 1256-60. The inside defendants in McLean argued for pro rata appor-
tionment. Id. at 1271.
96. Id. at 1272, 1276-77; see supra note 94. The court held the accounting firm
responsible for 10% of the plaintiff's losses and the inside sellers liable for the
remainder. Id. at 1276-77.
97. Id. at 1272-74.
98. Id. at 1272.
99. Fischer, supra note 72, at 1829-30 (discussing Gould and Wassel); Sullivan,
New Perspectives in Antitrust Litigation: Towards a Right of Comparative Contribu-
tion, 1980 U. Ill. L.F. 389, 398-401 (1980) (discussing McLean); Note, A Compara-
tive Fault Approach to the Due Diligence Requirement of Rule 10b-5, 49 Fordham
L. Rev. 561, 582-83 (1981) (discussing McLean); Note, The Role of Contribution in
Determining Underwriters' Liability Under Section 11 of the Securities Act of 1933.
63 Va. L. Rev. 79, 96-100 (1977) (discussing Feit and Gould); Federal Contribution,
supra note 52, at 1306-12 (discussing Gould); Brodsky, Apportionment of Damages
By Relative Fault In Securities Cases, N.Y.L.J., Jul. 19, 1978, at 1, col. 1 (discussing
McLean, Gould, and Feit). The American Law Institute has incorporated relative
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Gould court endorsed the relative fault concept but did not actually
apply it. 00  The "entity" theory of Feit and Wassel has not been
followed in subsequent cases, and the McLean decision, apportioning
contribution shares on the basis of relative fault, was reversed on
other grounds by the Third Circuit.' 0' The case law is thus in a state
of transition; the strict pro rata rule is being abandoned, but the exact
contours of the emerging alternative methods of apportionment have
yet to be explored fully.
II. A SUGGESTED APPROACH TO APPORTIONMENT
Apportionment of contribution shares according to the relative
fault of defendants is a desirable practice in many instances.0'  It
ensures that a less culpable outside defendant will not be saddled with
a disproportionate share of the total liability. 0 3 There are, however,
certain situations in which the apportionment of contribution shares
on an unequal basis would be inappropriate and ill-suited to the
implementation of the deterrent policies of the 1933 Act and the 1934
Act.
A. Section 10(b) of the 1934 Act
An apportionment of contribution shares on the basis of proportion-
ate fault presupposes the possibility of an appreciable disparity in the
relative culpability of the defendants.'0 4 This method of apportion-
ment is thus unsuited for actions brought under section 10(b) of the
1934 Act.
fault apportionment into its proposed Federal Securities Code. Fed. Sec. Code §
1724(f) (Official Draft 1980). In another context, the Supreme Court, in United
States v. Reliable Transfer Co., 421 U.S. 397 (1975), replaced the traditional admi-
ralty rule of pro rata contribution with a rule of proportionate fault. Id. at 401-11.
100. Gould v. American-Hawaiian S.S. Co., 387 F. Supp. 163, 171-72 (D. Del.
1974), vacated on other grounds, 535 F.2d 761 (3d Cir. 1976).
101. McLean v. Alexander, 599 F.2d 1190 (3d Cir. 1979). The circuit court held
that the accounting firm had not acted recklessly in preparing the audit because the
invoices pertaining to the transactions at issue appeared to be regular on their face
and, in any event, they were not so irregular as to put the firm on further inquiry into
the true nature of the underlying transactions. Id. at 1199-1201. The court acknowl-
edged that the firm had been negligent in the preparation of the audit but added
"'negligence-whether gross, grave or inexcusable-cannot serve as substitute for
scienter." Id. at 1198. Because it ruled that the accounting firm was not a joint
tortfeasor under § 10(b) of the 1934 Act, the circuit court did not have occasion to
pass upon the apportionment formula that the district court applied in the case. Id.
at 1202.
102. See supra notes 59, 71.
103. See supra notes 84-86 and accompanying text.
104. See McLean v. Alexander, 449 F. Supp. 1251, 1274 (D. Del. 1978), rev'd on
other grounds, 599 F.2d 1190 (3d Cir. 1979); Restatement (Second) of Torts § 886A
comment h, at 340-41 (1979).
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A section 11 plaintiff will have an overlapping section 10(b) cause
of action if he can establish that each defendant acted with scien-
ter. 05 This standard is satisfied upon a showing of intentional0 0 or
reckless misrepresentation, 0 7 but is not met by proof of mere negli-
gence.' 0 In the context of section 10(b), reckless conduct has been
characterized by the courts as substantially equivalent to intentional
conduct. 10 9 Reckless performance by an outside expert of the statu-
tory duties of investigation constitutes an extreme departure from the
standards of ordinary care. 0 The danger of misleading the public in
such a situation is so obvious that the reckless outside defendant must
either have intended to mislead the public or have known of the
misrepresentation and chosen to ignore the consequences of its
actions."' Any theoretical disparity in culpability that exists under
section 10(b) between an inside defendant whose liability is predi-
cated on intentional conduct and the outside defendant who acted
105. See supra note 9 and accompanying text. The term "scienter" refers to "a
mental state embracing intent to deceive, manipulate, or defraud." Aaron v. SEC,
446 U.S. 680, 686 n.5 (1980) (quoting Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 194
n.12 (1976)); accord Mendelsohn v. Capital Underwriters, 490 F. Supp. 1069, 1079
(N.D. Cal. 1979).
106. E.g., Aaron v. SEC, 446 U.S. 680, 691 (1980); Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder,
425 U.S. 185, 199 (1976); Franklin Sav. Bank v. Levy, 551 F.2d 521, 528 (2d Cir.
1977); SEC v. National Executive Planners Ltd., 503 F. Supp. 1066, 1073
(M.D.N.C. 1980); Ross v. Warner, 480 F. Supp. 268, 271 (S.D.N.Y. 1979); Brick v.
Dominion Mtge. & Realty Trust, 442 F. Supp. 283, 303 (W.D.N.Y. 1977).
107. E.g., G.A. Thompson & Co. v. Partridge, 636 F.2d 945, 961 (5th Cir. 1981);
McLean v. Alexander, 599 F.2d 1190, 1197-98 (3d Cir. 1979); Mansbach v. Prescott,
Ball & Turben, 598 F.2d 1017, 1023 (6th Cir. 1979); Edward J. Mawod & Co. v.
SEC, 591 F.2d 588, 596 (10th Cir. 1979); Hoffman v. Estabrook & Co., 587 F.2d
509, 516 (1st Cir. 1978); Rolf v. Blyth, Eastman Dillon & Co., 570 F.2d 38, 44-47
(2d Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1039 (1978).
108. E.g., Oleck v. Fischer, 623 F.2d 791, 795 (2d Cir. 1980); Wertheim & Co. v.
Codding Embryological Sciences, Inc., 620 F.2d 764, 766-67 (10th Cir. 1980);
Sanders v. John Nuveen & Co., 554 F.2d 790, 792 (7th Cir. 1977).
109. E.g., Wertheim & Co. v. Codding Embryological Sciences, Inc., 620 F.2d
764, 766-67 (10th Cir. 1980) (recklessness in the context of a 10(b) action is tanta-
mount to scienter and is defined as a frame of mind closer to a lesser form of intent
than to a greater degree of ordinary negligence); Broad v. Rockwell Int'l Corp., 614
F.2d 418, 440 (5th Cir. 1980) (same), aff'd on rehearing, 642 F.2d 929 (5th Cr.),
petition for cert. filed, 50 U.S.L.W. 3046 (U.S. Jul. 16, 1981) (No. 81-239); Rolf v.
Blyth, Eastman Dillon & Co., 570 F.2d 38, 47 (2d Cir.) (same), cert. denied, 439
U.S. 1039 (1978); Sanders v. John Nuveen & Co., 554 F.2d 790, 793 (7th Cir. 1977)
(same); Marbury Management v. Kohn, 470 F. Supp. 509, 516 n.12 (S.D.N.Y. 1979)
(same), aff'd in part, rev'd in part on other grounds, 629 F.2d 705 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 449 U.S. 1011 (1980).
110. Broad v. Rockwell Int'l Corp., 614 F.2d 418, 440 (5th Cir. 1980), affd on
rehearing, 642 F.2d 929 (5th Cir.), petition for cert. filed, 50 U.S.L.W. 3046 (U.S.
Jul. 16, 1981) (No. 81-239); Rolf v. Blyth, Eastman Dillon & Co., 570 F.2d 38, 47
(2d Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1039 (1978); Sanders v. John Nuveen & Co., 554
F.2d 790, 793 (7th Cir. 1977).
111. Healey v. Catalyst Recovery, Inc., 616 F.2d 641, 649 (3d Cir. 1980).
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recklessly will not be of sufficient magnitude to warrant an unequal
distribution of the liability through relative fault apportionment."12
The overriding deterrent policy of section 10(b) demands invoking the
pro rata rule in these cases.
The function of an outside expert in a corporate offering is to
investigate and thereby insure the accuracy of the information in the
registration statement."13 When the expert intentionally or recklessly
fails to make an adequate investigation, it commits an egregious
breach of its statutory duties, jeopardizing the interests of the invest-
ing public. The threat of civil liability encourages outside experts to
make a thorough investigation of the issuer."14 Contribution among
defendants enhances the deterrent effect of this policy by exposing
every defendant to liability.115 A rule of pro rata apportionment
maximizes this deterrent effect by ensuring that an outside defendant
found liable in a section 10(b) action will bear an equal share of the
total, potentially onerous '1 6 liability with the other defendants.
B. Section 11 of the 1933 Act
In contrast to the scienter requirement of liability under section
10(b) of the 1934 Act, the range of conduct that is actionable under
section 11 of the 1933 Act encompasses negligence, recklessness and
intentional misrepresentation." 7  For example, if an inside defendant
knowingly inserted a misrepresentation in the registration statement,
the outside defendants would be jointly and severally liable to the
purchasers if they negligently failed to uncover and expose the misrep-
resentation." 8 To be sure, the outside defendants have breached
their statutory duty of investigation in such a situation and are prop-
erly accountable for a portion of the plaintiff's losses." 9 Because their
112. Marrero v. Abraham, 473 F. Supp. 1271, 1278 (E.D. La. 1979); see Broad v.
Rockwell Int'l Corp., 614 F.2d 418, 440 (5th Cir. 1980), ajJ'd on rehearing, 642 F.2d
929 (5th Cir.), petition for cert. filed, 50 U.S.L.W. 3046 (U.S. Jul. 16, 1981) (No.
81-239); Roll v. Blyth, Eastman Dillon & Co., 570 F.2d 38, 47 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 439 U.S. 1039 (1978); Sanders v. John Nuveen & Co., 554 F.2d 790, 793 (7th
Cir. 1977).
113. Globus v. Law Research Serv., 287 F. Supp. 188, 199 (S.D.N.Y. 1968), affd
in part, rev'd in part on other grounds, 418 F.2d 1276 (2d Cir. 1969), cert. denied,
397 U.S. 913 (1970); see supra notes 24-26 and accompanying text.
114. Globus v. Law Research Serv., 287 F. Supp. 188, 199 (S.D.N.Y. 1968), afJ'd
in part, rev'd in part on other grounds, 418 F.2d 1276 (2d Cir. 1969), cert. denied,
397 U.S. 913 (1970).
115. See supra note 56 and accompanying text.
116. See supra notes 15-16 and accompanying text.
117. Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 208 (1976); Straus v. Holiday
Inns, 460 F. Supp. 729, 732 (S.D.N.Y. 1978); see 3 L. Loss, supra note 23, at
1721-25.
118. But see infra notes 121-23 and accompanying text.
119. See supra notes 5-6 and accompanying text.
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breach was the result of negligence, however, rather than an inten-
tional design, it would not merit the severe sanctions that will poten-
tially flow from pro rata apportionment of liability.1 20 Assignment of
contribution shares on the basis of relative fault ensures that every
defendant will bear the liability in proportion to the degree to which
it was responsible for the misrepresentation.
The deterrent effect of civil liability under section 11 is not weak-
ened by relative fault apportionment. Section 11 expressly provides all
defendants other than the issuer with the defense of due diligence.' 2 1
To establish this defense, the defendant must affirmatively demon-
strate that it undertook a thorough investigation of the issuer. 122  A
due diligence defense totally absolves a defendant of liability. 23 The
availability of this complete defense serves the deterrent policy of civil
liability by encouraging outside defendants to comply with the statu-
tory requirement of a thorough independent investigation. Any fur-
ther incentive to comply, such as the threat of an equal apportion-
ment of the liability for a misrepresentation, is therefore unnecessary.
Moreover, it is submitted that relative fault apportionment imple-
ments the deterrent policy of section 11 better than pro rata appor-
tionment could. A knowing wrongdoer under section 11 would be
120. See 3 A. Bromberg & L. Lowenfels, Securities Fraud & Commodities Fraud
§ 8.5(585), at 208.52 (1981).
121. Securities Act of 1933, § 11(b), 15 U.S.C. § 77k(b) (1976). The elements of a
due diligence defense vary according to which part of the registration statement
contains the misrepresentation or omission. As to any part of the registration state-
ment not purporting to be made on the authority of any expert, the outside defendant
must show that "after [a] reasonable investigation, [he had] reasonable ground to
believe and did believe, at the time such part of the registration statement became
effective, that the statements therein were true and that there was no omission to
state a material fact required to be stated therein or necessary to make the statements
therein not misleading." Id. § 11(b)(3)(A), 15 U.S.C. § 77k(b)(3)(A) (1976). With
respect to any portion of the registration statement purporting to be made on the
authority of an expert, such as the certified financial statements, a due diligence
defense is somewhat easier to establish. The outside defendant need not establish a
reasonable investigation. Instead, he need only show that "he had no reasonable
ground to believe and did not believe, at the time such part of the registration
statement became effective, that the statements therein were untrue or that there was
an omission to state a material fact required to be stated therein or necessary to make
the statements therein not misleading .... ." Id. § 11(b)(3)(C), 15 U.S.C. §
77k(b)(3)(C) (1976). The requirements of the due diligence defense to § 11 liability
are exhaustively detailed in the leading case of Escott v. BarChris Constr. Corp., 283
F. Supp. 643, 682-84 (S.D.N.Y. 1968), and thoroughly discussed and explained in
Folk, supra note 2, at 19-82. The standard of reasonable investigation and reasonable
ground for belief under § 11(c) is that of a "prudent man in the management of his
own property." 15 U.S.C. § 77k(c) (1976).
122. Escott v. BarChris Constr. Corp., 283 F. Supp. 643, 682-83 (S.D.N.Y. 1968);
Securities Act of 1933, § 11(b)(3), 15 U.S.C. § 77k(b)(3) (1976).
123. Securities Act of 1933, § 11(b), 15 U.S.C. § 77k(b) (1976). The issuer can only
avoid § 11 liability by establishing that the plaintiff was aware of the misrepresenta-
tion or omission at the time of his purchase. Id. § 11(a), 15 U.S.C. § 77k(a) (1976).
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more deterred by a rule that required him to bear most of the liability
than by a rule of apportionment that permitted him to share the
liability equally with another. At the same time, negligent defendants
will be neither over-burdened nor absolved by such a rule.
CONCLUSION
The contraction of the strict pro rata rule for the apportionment of
contribution shares in federal securities actions is a favorable develop-
ment. As the McLean court stated, the rule was often "characterized
by more mathematical than judicial integrity."' 2 4 Apportionment
based on proportionate fault offers the attractive possibility of more
fairly distributing the plaintiff's losses among the responsible defen-
dants. In the context of section 10(b) of the 1934 Act, however, the
pro rata method of apportionment continues to serve an important
deterrent function and should be retained. Apportionment of contri-
bution shares based on the relative fault of the parties should be
reserved for actions brought under section 11 of the 1933 Act.
Jeffrey Edmund LaGueux
124. McLean v. Alexander, 449 F. Supp. 1251, 1273 (D. Del. 1978), revd on
other grounds, 599 F.2d 1190 (3d Cir. 1979).
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